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REGIME CHANGE AS REGIME MAINTENANCE:
THE MILITARY VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN FIJI*
Stephanie Lawson
Introduction
The Westminster system of parliamentary government has served as a regime model
for many of Britain's former colonial states. But as a transplanted regime type, it has
had fairly limited success in adapting to exotic political environments. Until the
military coup of 1987, Fiji appeared to provide one of the outstanding exceptions to
the Westminster model's otherwise dismal record of failure elsewhere. Once de
scribed by Pope John Paul II as a 'symbol of hope' for the rest of the world, Fiji has
now institutionalized its own version ofpolitical apartheid in the name of 'indigenous
rights'. Even before the coup, however, the democratic basis of Fiji's constitutional
order had been modified to the extent that a number of its provisions were designed to
secure a special position for indigenous Fijians vis-d-vis the substantial Fiji Indian
community. This deviation from modem democratic norms was meant to stabilize
Fiji's 'plural society' by ensuring equal representation in the House of Representa
tives for the two major ethnic groups as well as securing indigenous rights to land.
For the first seventeen years following independence it seemed that this
model had achieved broad acceptance by most parts of the polity. During that time,
the office of government was held continuously by the Fijian-dominated Alliance
Party led by one ofFiji's paramount chiefs, RatuSirKamisese Mara. In April 1987,
however, the Alliance Party was defeated at the polls by a coalition comprising the
relatively newmultiracial LabourParty and Fiji 's oldest political party, the National
Federation Party, which had always attracted the bulk of Fiji Indian support. Less
than six weeks afterthe elections, thenew government was overthrown by a military
coup. Both the democratic constitutional regime and its corollary model of civil-
military relations were shown to have been acceptable to Alliance leaders and
supporters, as well as to key elements in the military, only so long as the Alliance
retained office as government. In other words, those democratic norms associated
with the doctrine ofconstitutionalism and the principle ofalternation in government
lacked a secure foundation in Fiji's political culture.
.This paper is a modified version of a chapter forthcoming in V. Selochan and RJ. May (eds).
The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific.
The military intervened again some six months later when coup leader
Rabuka1 accused civilian leaders, including his own traditional paramount chiefs,
of failing to follow through his initial 'objectives', namely, the absolute entrench
ment of 'indigenous rights'. In subsequent developments the 1970 constitution was
abrogated, Fiji declared a republic, a civilian administration installed, and a new
constitution promulgated in the name of the 'Sovereign Democratic Republic of
Fiji'. Elections are expected to be held early in 1992 and the rigid discriminatory
electoral and parliamentary membership provisions of the new constitution will
almost certainly ensure the return of a government sympathetic to the stated
objectives of Rabuka's coup. Given the likelihood of this scenario, it might be
thought that the conditions for future civilian supremacy— albeit within a tradition
alist/authoritarian framework—will be firmly established while, conversely, those
conditions most conducive to praetorianism will be weakened considerably. But
this depends ultimately on the strength of the new constitutional regime and its
institutions. These purport to rest on a 'traditional' Fijian foundation of authority,
and chiefly leaders have the advantage of being able to evoke powerful symbols of
legitimacy. But the appeal of these symbols and the institutions they now support
is limited to a minority of the population. Furthermore, the recent history of Fiji
suggests that, at the very least, the future role of the Fiji Military Forces will be to
act as coven guardian of the 'national interest'. In the terms ordained by Rabuka's
'objectives', this national interest necessarily precludes a return to a more demo
cratic constitutional regime which would allow adequate participation in politics by
the entire body of citizens, including Fijians, Fiji Indians, and the relatively small
number of other people (including Chinese, part-Europeans, and other Pacific
Islanders) for whom Fiji is home.
In examining these issues in more detail, this study takes as its primary focus
the notion of 'regime vulnerability' as applied to the civil institutions ofgovernment
in Fiji both before and after the coup. In adopting this approach we shall of course
consider the past, present, and future role of the military with particular emphasis
on its relationship with civilian authority. As a necessary preface to this study, we
must clarify first what is meant by 'regime vulnerabilty', especially in terms of the
comparative strength or weakness of civil institutions.
Regime vulnerablity
Following its early articulation by Finer (1962), the idea that the level of political
culture in a given society (and the concomitant strength of its civil institutions) is
decisive for the regime's vulnerability to military intervention has underscored a host
of later studies (for example, Huntington 1968; Perlmutter 1981; Rapoport 1982;
Luckham 1971; Eide and Thee 1980). And although the general notion has no
necessary or exclusive link with the collapse of post-colonial democratic regimes in
the Third World, many of the case studies undertaken within this context address
precisely the 'failure of democracy' syndrome. Further, Finer's conceptual frame
work clearly supports the assumption that Western democracies have achieved a
'mature political culture' through which civilian institutions are strongly legitimated,
whereas political and social institutions elsewhere are relatively weak and lacking in
legitimacy (see Berghahn 1981:69). In much of the literature on Fiji that has bur
geoned since the coup, the assumptions underlying Finer's basic proposition have
received implicit support. Various justifications offered by Fiji's military leader, and
many supporters of his initial intervention and subsequent role in the process of
constitutional change, have also served to reinforce the images projected by Finer's
claims.
The utility ofthe concept ofregime vulnerabilty has attracted some criticism,
especially in terms of its explanatory and predictive force. Luckham (1971 : 10), for
example, points out that the criteria for determining the strength of civilian
institutions assumes, in many cases, precisely that which needs to be explained. He
refers to several of the criteria proposed by Finer, and especially to the requirement
that there must be 'publicly agreed procedures for the transfer of power' (ibid. : 1 1 ).
Luckham suggests that the coup itself may, in some circumstances, 'become a
publicly recognized and quasi-legitimate means forthe transferofpower* (ibid.). One
implication ofthis is that the presence ofpublicly-agreed procedures/wre does not
serve adequately to distinguish 'weak' civil institutions from 'strong' civil institu
tions. But Finer's basic criterion is rescued from any ambiguity in its application if
we simply add the premise that publicly-agreed procedures for transferring power
from one government to another must exclude any form of military intervention
(and this is undoubtedly what Finer meant). It is certainly the case that any
democratic method devised for the transfer of power must, by definition, preclude
military intervention, for modem democratic theory and practice is founded, inter
alia, on strictly constitutionalist principles which deny the legitimacy offorce, orthe
threat of force, in determining succession of government.
Anothercritic oforthodox regime vulnerability theory,Thompson ( 1 975 :459,
466), suggests that hypotheses subscribing to the weakness of governmental
institutions as a standing invitation to domestic military intervention are virtually
tautological and, further, that over-emphasis on the themes which support such
hypotheses has obscured the role ofthe military as a homuspoliticus in its own right.
Four themes are identified by Thompson (ibid.:460-64). One is that the study of
unique historical and cultural legacies provides an essential explanation for present
behaviour. A second concerns the 'failure of democracy' which is predicated on
excessive diversity within the polity, a lack of democratic preconditions, and a
general disillusionment when economic improvements lag well behind expecta
tions. Anothertheme extends the second by employing the notion ofa political void.
This void is created by the absence of traditional loyalties to constitutionalist forms
which leads in turn to institutional atrophy. The military, acting as a Hobbesian
trump, is drawn into the void. Finally, the 'disjointed system' theme concentrates
on the lack of authoritative formulae for the resolution of conflict. In this situation,
rival groups seeking to establish their own primacy continually undermine that
sense of community essential to the structural development of central, legitimate
institutions. In the absence of such institutional development— and depending on
the evolutionary stage of class relations — the military may be pulled into a
praetorian role of conservative guardianship. Thompson (ibid.:466) comes to the
unremarkable conclusion that all these themes 'share a common image of the
military coup: weak political systems pull the military into action.' A key purpose
ofThompson's review ofthese themes, however, is not to demonstrate the obvious,
but to construct an alternative image of the location of the military within the state.
This location is described by Thompson (ibid. :486-87) from a praeorian perspective
insofar as the military is perceived to be an integral part ofthe political system rather
than an entity which operates outside it. This has some important implications for
the present study which we shall return to at a later point. For the present it is
necessary to clarify the conceptual issues further by examining the notion of
'regime' itself.
In most of the literature on military intervention, the terms 'regime' and
'government' are used interchangeably. This is perhaps because the overthrow of
a government generally entails, ipso facto, the overthrow of the regime. Further
more, most writers in the area are content to utilize the concept of 'regime* simply
as a term to attach to 'civil' or 'military '. But although regime and government are
closely related, they are not the same thing, and it is important to understand the
basic analytical distinctions between them. This is especially so in the case of Fiji
when we come to consider the notion of legitimacy and how it operates at different
levels. Also vital to the study of political structures and their legitimacy is, rather
obviously, the state. Control of the state apparatus is the focal issue in cases of
military intervention, and associated ideological contestations revolving around
nationalism are usually linked directly with this quest for control. The relationships
between state, regime, and government are complex, and have been discussed more
extensively elsewhere (Lawson 1991b). In order to at least differentiate these
structures for the purpose of the present discussion, it must suffice to say that the
state itself is the locus of political power while the concept of regime is concerned
with how, and by whom, that power is exercised. In other words, 'regime' is
concerned with the form of rule (see Chazan et al. 1988).
Governments are awarded management or control of the state apparatus in
accordance with the norms and principles of the regime which are embodied, for
practical purposes, in certain rules and procedures. Governments derive much of
thci r legitimacy as controllers ormanagers ofthe state apparatus from the norms and
rules of the regime. These are generally embodied in a constitution which sets out
those 'publicly agreed procedures for the transfer of power'. All this is implicit in
the democratic doctrine of constitutionalism. At another level, however, the regime
itself requires legitimacy. And where this is weakly supported, it follows that the
regime— and governments formed under it— are vulnerable to challenges which,
in the particular case we are dealing with here, came in the form of military
intervention. The point in setting up this rather formalized schema here is to clarify
the point that 'regime vulnerability' entails more thanjust 'governmentvulnerability'.
In the case of Fiji, both the government that was overthrown, and the regime
under which it was formed, were regarded by the military and other opponents of
the government as lacking an essential legitimacy. This is clearly evident in the
justifications surrounding the coup and the subsequent process of constitutional
change. But to understand the problems associated with political legitimacy, it is
important to examine the historical context which gave rise to the civil institutions
of post-colonial Fiji, and the specific factors which contributed to their essential
'weakness'. Through this it will be seen that the various hypotheses concerning
regime vulnerability are indeed relevant, not only to the analysis ofthe original coup
in Fiji, but to the future of civil-military relations there.
Fiji's colonial legacy 2
British colonial rule was established in Fiji in 1874 following a period of internal
strife occasioned partly by the activities ofEuropean settlers and traders in the eastern
regions of the island group. It was in this region, too, that the most powerful of the
Fijian confederacies were located and rivalries between leading chiefs there exacer
bated the general deterioration in domestic politics that followed European contact
The British government was to some extent a reluctant colonizer at this time. The
further extension of empire in the remote Pacific promised little in the way of
economic rewards and only the potential for strategic advantage offered any return on
their 'investment'. The general policy towards the new colony of Fiji, then, was that
its administration should pose as small a financial burden to Whitehall as possible
and, ideally, that it should be economically self-sufficient. Fiji's first substantive
governor, Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, therefore set about implementing a set of
policies which were directed not only towards establishing a solid financial base for
the new colony, but which reflected also a relatively new approach to the 'manage
ment' of colonial subjects. The strategies adopted by Gordon to secure these objec
tives were decisive for the later development of politics in Fiji.
The first of these strategies concerned 'native policy' and this was aimed
partly at making the colonial experience for Fijians an exception to the dismal
history of colonized people in other parts of the empire. One of the measures
introduced was the reservation of those Fijian lands not already 'legally' alienated
to white settlers, and the prohibition of any further land alienation. Although this
measure was sound in principle, the method by which land tenure was assigned on
the basis of certain kinship groups, and which remains in place to this day, imposed
a uniformity and inflexibility that bore little resemblance to pre-colonial Fijian
practices. The land tenure system has since served as a serious impediment to the
efficient and equitable utilization ofland resources amongst Fijians. In addition, the
bureaucratic structures relating to the administration of land, including the leasing
of agricultural land to both Fijian and Fiji Indian tenants, have creamed offmuch of
the income from leases. A substantial proportion ofthe remaining funds is distributed
to chiefs. Fijian 'commoners' receive few direct benefits from the leasing of their
lands, and this was one of the issues that the Labour-NFP coalition government had
placed on the political agenda. Concern for the security of indigenous land rights
was made a focal issue by the Alliance Party during the 1987 elections and figured
prominently in the rhetoric surrounding justification of the coup. It is therefore
important to note that the 1970 constitution of independent Fiji provided triple
entrenchmentofFijian rights with respect to land and other customary entitlements.
A second strategy for securing the principles of the new enlightened native
policy was the establishment of a system of indirect rule. This was achieved by
taking the relatively authoritarian chiefly structures of control which characterized
socio-political organization in the eastern regions as the basis for the system, and
imposing these uniformly over the entire island group. In addition, selective
recruitment to the colonial bureaucracy from amongsteasterners served to marginalize
Fijians from other regions. One consequence ofthis was that eastern chiefs achieved
much greater prominence within the colonial regime. As political institutions
evolved from an initially rigid crown colony system to something resembling
responsible government in the pre-independence period, eastern chiefs retained
their political prominence and reinforced their prospects for future control through
the formation ofthe Alliance Party. This underscored exclusive claims to political
legitimacy by eastern chiefs vis-d-vis any other political group in Fiji.
The third strategy employed by the colonial administration involved balanc
ing the policy of 'native protection' with the requirement of financial self-suffi
ciency. The use ofFijian labour in the emerging plantation economy was viewed as
detrimental to the traditional Fijian way of life and Governor Gordon looked
immediately to the Indian sub-continent from which other British colonies had
successfully recruited their 'helots ofempire'. The first Indian indentured labourers
arrived in Fiji in 1879 and by the time the system was abolished in 1916, Fiji had
acquired a substantial, and permanent, population ofFiji Indians whose descendants
now comprise around 46 per cent of the total population. This created what is
commonly described as Fiji's 'plural society' in which the two major ethnic groups
are perceived as constituting monolithic entities in a two-sided contest for political
power. This perception is largely responsible for popular conceptions concerning
the essentially 'racial' cause of the May 1987 coup. And although most academic
commentators — with the notable exception of Scarr (1988) — have evinced a
complex array of causes which point to the salience of other decisive factors, the
general perception of contemporary developments in Fiji remains fixed firmly
within a racially-oriented paradigm.
Another aspect of Fiji's colonial legacy which is closely related to the
developments outlined above, and with the issue of eastern chiefly legitimacy,
concerns the doctrine ofFijian 'paramountcy ofinterests'. This doctrine upholds the
supremacy of Fijian interests over and above the interests of any other racial or
ethnic group in Fiji. It developed as a colonial version ofan indigenous rights charter
which, although never formally codified, developed into a powerful orthodoxy. The
doctrine's initial purpose was to underscore the early policies instituted by Gordon.
As we have seen, these had been designed largely to protect Fijians from European
settler exploitation. But as the Fiji Indian community grew, the doctrine was
employed by European and Fijian leaders alike as a counter to the Fiji Indians' quest
for social, political, and economic rights. It became, in effect, a forceful rhetorical
weapon in a war of subjugation which was at first prosecuted most vigorously by
the small but influential European commercial elite concerned to retain their own
privileged position in the colony. This enabled Europeans, inter alia, to represent
themselves as champions of the Fijian people and guardians of their interests. For
their part, Fijian political leaders, who were drawn almost exclusively from chiefly
ranks (with easterners predominating), took up the same rhetorical stance and
denounced Fiji Indian claims for equal political rights as anathema to the interests
of the Fijians as a whole.
This, ofcourse, raises questions as to the precise natureofthe interests ofeach
'group', and especially whether the interests of chiefs are automatically consonant
with those of commoners. One must question also the notion that any interests
espoused by the eastern chiefly elite necessarily accord with the interests of Fijians
in other regions. These issues will be considered later in the context ofcontemporary
politics. For the moment it is important to note that the doctrine of Fijian para
mountcy developed a political salience which went far beyond its original utility.
Wehave seen already that Fijian rights relating to land and otherresources were well
established in the early colonial period and firmly secured through the 1970
constitution. But the general themes of the doctrine, combined with the spectre of
an 'Indian land-grab', continued to be pursued by Alliance and other nationalist
leaders at the level of political rhetoric (and invective) in post-independence
electoral campaigns. With respect to the Alliance and the eastern chiefly elite, this
served the instrumental purpose of uniting the bulk of the Fijian electorate behind
their leadership in direct opposition to Fiji Indians. Furthermore, the Alliance
presented its leadership as the embodiment of all that is distinctively, traditionally,
and legitimately 'Fijian'.
Both the formal political institutions and the party system that emerged in the
late colonial period reflected these earlierdevelopments, as did the 1970constitution
of independent Fiji. Apart from recognizing and securing the special rights and
interests of indigenous Fijians, the constitution provided for a complex system of
communal representation through which equal numbers of Fiji Indians and Fijians
were returned as members of the House of Representatives. In addition, eight
'general' members were to be returned as representatives of 'other races'. Most of
these were ofEuropean descent and were aligned politically with the Alliance Party.
This meant that despite formal parity of representation for Fiji Indians, the racial
allocation of seats gave an immediate electoral advantage to the Alliance and,
indeed, seemed designed to ensure that the Alliance would continue indefinitely in
office. Viewed in this light, the 1970 constitution cannot be seen as an instrument
for securing the practice ofdemocratic politics beyond the formal superficialities of
parliamentary government. More specifically, the principle of alternation in gov
ernment, which is an essential hallmark of modern representative democracy, was
undermined to the extent that the legitimacy of the opposition party as a potential
or actual government was not recognized by the Alliance leadership.
Continued Alliance dominance, however, depended on their maintaining a
solid electoral base amongst Fijians. Any intra-Fijian disunity would necessarily
erode mis base and leave the Alliance vulnerable to electoral defeat, and this is
precisely what happened in the elections of 1987. Although the Labour-NFP
coalition was unable to attract more than around 10 per cent of the overall Fijian
vote, it was able to muster sufficient Fijian and 'other races' support in several
crucial urban and peri-urban constituencies. This, combined with a further slippage
of Alliance support to minor parties and independents as well as a significant level
ofFijian abstentionfrom voting, gave the coalition a majorityofseats. But the events
which followed the formation ofthe new government indicated clearly the extent to
which it lacked that widespread legitimacy essential to the principle of alternation
in government. DespiteRatu Mara's formalconcessionofdefeat, Alliancemembers
boycotted the opening of parliament and several became involved in the activities
of the extremist Taukei movement— a nationalist Fijian group which emerged in
the aftermath of the Alliance's defeat and which resolved to bring down the new
government. Mara maintained a public silence which was seen to implicitly endorse
their activities. Andwhenthe army intervened less than six weeks afterthe elections,
Mara was amongst the first to join the initial administration set up by coup leader
Rabuka.
The point of the foregoing discussion has been to highlight a number of
important factors which, taken together, served to undermine the legitimacy of the
political institutions established by the 1970 constitution, thereby rendering them
'weak* and vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability operated at two levels. First, it
is evident that any governmentotherthan the Alliance could be portrayed rhetorically
as a significant threat to Fijian rights — a logical corollary to the idea that only the
Alliance could guarantee the rights and interests of all Fijians. These ideas were
taken much further than the original doctrine of paramountcy of interests implied,
for this was basically concerned with the protection of lands and customary matters
which remained constitutionally entrenched no matter which government was in
power. In turn, this doctrine was invoked to deny virtually any political legitimacy
to Fiji Indians and, it must be added, to those dissident Fijians who formed the
backbone ofthe Fiji LabourParty. Put simply, the legitimacy ofthe new government
was weakly supported, and therefore vulnerable to challenge, since it was opposed
by a dominant political discourse which had succeeded in elevating a particular
group of Fijians to a position of almost exclusive authority.
The second aspect ofvulnerability operated at the regime level. Although the
constitution was, arguably, designed to entrench a one-party dominant system, it
nonetheless supported formally all those democratic constitutionalist principles
associated with the notion that no one political group is entitled to lay exclusive
claims to legitimacy and, through this, control of the state apparatus. It is clearly
evident that neither the Alliance Party nor the military accepted the legitimacy of a
regime which allowed succession of government according to democratic consti
tutionalist norms and principles. In other words, those 'publicly agreed procedures
for the transfer of power' provided by the constitution were, when put to the test,
shown to lack universal acceptance. This viewhasbeen reinforcedbythepromulgation
of the new republican constitution, the rules ofwhich seek to prevent the possibility
of any such succession occuring again.
The new constitutional order, however, is one which undoubtedly lacks the
support of a majority of the population in Fiji. Although this has not been tested by
way of a referendum, one can assert fairly confidently that most Fiji Indians would
regard it as illegitimate. And since the new electoral provisions for Fijians are
grossly biased in favour of the eastern provinces, it is not unreasonable to assume
that Fijians on the main island of Viti Levu will resent and resist eastern dominance
— especially those in the west whose history of dissidence suggests more than a
little reluctance to endorse eastern legitimacy. In addition, the allocation of Fijian
seats is weighted most heavily against the more 'progressive* urban Fijians who
make up around one third of the Fijian population but who have been awarded only
five ofthe 37 Fijian seats. Taken together, these factors suggest weak support forthe
new regime and, as a consequence, for any government formed under its provisions.
Whether this will promote susceptibility to further military intervention, or at least
a praetorian role forthe military, is another question, and one best addressed now by
reference to the development of Fiji's military forces and its role in contemporary
politics.
The military in Fiji
The origins and development of Fiji's military forces reflect clearly the socio-political
dimensions of Fiji's pre-colonial and colonial history. When Governor Gordon took
over the administration of the colony, there was already a small military force known
as the Royal Army which had been used by Fiji's leading eastern chief, Cakobau, and
his British supporters in an attempt to control the central and western regions. Gordon
continued to employ this unit for its original purpose of subjugation, thereby rein
forcing eastern chiefly authority and interests. Following the relative success of these
early pacification operations, the unit (which had meanwhile been renamed the
Armed Native Constabulary) was amalgamated with the police of the Fiji Constabu
lary. In the early 1920s, further 'pacification' operations were conducted against
striking Indian workers (Sanday 1989:3).
From the beginning, then, armed forces in Fiji were utilized largely for
coercing troublesome groups in the interests of internal political stability thereby
assuming the colonial-bureaucratic role of 'the ultimate custodians ofdomestic law
and order' (Luckham 1991:3). This early emphasis, and especially the identification
of 'troublesome' with dissident western Fijians and Fiji Indians, saw the already
dominant position of 'loyal' easterners further reinforced through selective recruit
ment to the constabulary—and later to the regular armed forces. This is a very clear
manifestation of Enloe's (1980:16) conception of 'security mapping' where the
ethnically determined basis of recruitment involves convenient geographical con
centrations. Further, it is evident that the early orientation of state security in Fiji
was strongly biased towards 'the maintenance of congenial domestic class and
ethnic patterns of order' (ibid. :14).
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The later development of Fiji's military as an entity distinct from the police,
and as a standing army in its own right, was given its major impetus by the call of
empire. Two world wars and the Malayan Emergency saw troops from Fiji serve
monarch and empire in defence, presumably, of'democracy' . Back home, however,
little progress had been made with respect to democratic rights for Fiji Indians, and
this had a direct effect on military recruitment for World War II. Many Fiji Indian
grievances had been centred on the issue of parity ofpolitical rights and status with
Europeans (not Fijians). When the war broke out, the sense of inequitable political
treatment was further exacerbated by differential pay rates for Fiji Indians and
Europeans in the army and most Fiji Indians declined to volunteer for service forthis
reason. The only Indian platoon in the army, which had been formed in 1934 despite
some resistance on the part of the colonial administration and the chiefs, was
disbanded (Sharma 1990:63). This not only strengthened the apparent political
divide between Fiji Indians and the othercommunities, but served also to consolidate
the army as an essentially Fijian institution.
At the time of the coup in 1987 the composition of the Royal Fiji Military
Forces (RFMF) was 98 per cent Fijian. They were led by Brigadier Ratu Epeli
Nailatikau, a high chief from the east and also son-in-law of Prime Minister Mara.
Although many able commoners had been admitted to high-ranking positions,
including the then third-ranking officer Lieutenant-Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, men
from eastern chiefly families were disproportionately represented in the officer
corps. Those commoners, like Rabuka, who had achieved high rank were also drawn
in disproportionate numbers from the east. Saffu ( 1 990: 1 62) suggests that the extent
of eastern dominance in the RFMF, together with the historical factors outlined
earlier, was responsible for the development ofa 'traditional-aristocratic' pattern of
civil-military relations which operated alongside the liberal-democratic pattern
throughout the independence period until May 1987. Saffu (ibid.:\59) argues also
that both patterns were compatible with civilian political supremacy until the
electoral victory ofthe coalition when the liberal-democratic pattern was abrogated
abruptly 'because it did not guarantee control of the state by chiefs and other
traditionalists ' . This is consistent with the arguments put forward earlier concerning
the lack oflegitimacy accorded both to the coalition and to the regime under which
the new government was formed.
Another aspect ofthe analysis, and one which is vital to future developments
in civil-military relations inFiji, concerns the prospects for the traditional-aristocratic
model. Saffu (ibid.: 159) draws on Nordlinger's (1977) work in identifying the core
features of the model. The most basic indicator supporting civilian supremacy is a
strong identification of social and political values between civilian and military
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leaders in an essentially 'pre-democratic' system. Civilian leaders are regarded as
legitimate insofar as they are part ofthe same social network of aristocratic families
that provides military leaders. Sanday (1991:253) says that this pattern was reflected
in a pervasive belief amongst indigenous Fijians that political power was the
exclusive preserve of the chiefs. The role of the military in post-coup Fiji to date
seems to point to a continuation of the traditional-aristocratic pattern.
In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Rabuka established a sixteen-
memberCouncil ofMinisters comprising eleven Alliance parliamentarians (including
Mara) and four members of the nationalist Taukei movement. Rabuka himself, as
head of this body, was the only military member. This was replaced shortly
afterwards with an eighteen-member Council of Advisors which, as a necessary
facade for at least qualified domestic and international acceptance, included three
Fiji Indians as well as Bavadra. Rabuka, however, remained a leading member. The
new arrangements, and of course the coup itself, were endorsed wholeheartedly by
the Council of Chiefs who had resolved that the miltary should be asked to review
the 1970 constitution in order to ensure that Fijians were guaranteed control of
government at all times (Lai 1988:87). And Rabuka's ambitions for the military
were expressed unambiguously in numerous statements on its future role, including
an assertion that the military would remain an integral part of any kind of political
system, irrespective of what form it might take (ibid. : 1 1 3).
In the meantime, some rapprochement had been reached between the civilian
actors in the play of negotiations. A degree of moderation had started to prevail as
Taukeist leaders, and Rabuka himself, became increasingly marginalized in the
process ofnegotiations which led eventually to the ' Deuba Accord '—an agreement
under which both the Alliance and the deposed coalition were to participate on equal
terms in a caretaker government under the governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia
Ganilau (Robertson and Tamanisau 1988:138). Although Rabuka had apparently
agreed to support the new accord, it is evident that his intentions were otherwise.
Two hours before the governor-general was scheduled to inform the nation of the
new caretaker government, Rabuka led a second coup to enforce his original
'objectives'. Within days Rabuka announced the complete abrogation of the 1970
constitution and declared himself head of a republican government ( ibid.:\42). But
Rabuka's position as head ofthe republic, although supported by military force, was
untenable politically. Leaving international opinion aside, Rabuka could not, as a
commoner, hope to legitimate himself as leader at that time. In his own rationale for
both coups, Rabuka had consistently promoted the paramount importance ofFijian
'tradition' and the virtually sacrosanct political position ofchiefs in this context. So
powerful had the rhetoric about chiefly authority become that it left Rabuka in the
position ofbeing unable to command personally the symbolic resources associated
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with political legitimacy in Fiji. In his own words, Rabuka had claimed that the
military was 'trying to protect the chiefs and their people' and, further, that it was
the 'duty of the warrior tribe to protect the chief (quoted in Norton 1990:139).
In the wake of the second coup, then, the eastern chiefly elite returned once
more to the helm of government, replacing the Taukeist council which Rabuka had
installed as an interim measure. Rabuka continued for a time as a member of the
ministry but was later forced to 'return to barracks' at the behest of Mara who had
given him the choice of either resigning from the military, or from the government.
In August 1991 , however, Rabuka decided to quit the military in order to pursue a
political career, and returned to the post of co-deputy prime minister and minister
for Home Affairs in the interim government. At the time of writing, Ganilau
continues to occupy the position of president while Mara remains prime minister.
Rabuka's political ambitions, however, are well known and his decision to enter
civilian politics as a leading member of the Fijian Political Party (FPP) (which was
formed with the backing of the leading chiefs) is a clear enough indication that he
will be a contender for the prime ministership in the elections due to be held in the
first half of 1992. Given the lack of suitable chiefly successors to Mara in the FPP,
as well as the emergence of several rival Fijian parties, the longer-term outlook for
stable government under the chiefly establishment is uncertain. This brings us back
to the question, posed at the beginning, concerning the prospects for continuing
civilian supremacy and whether the new regime is itself vulnerable to some kind of
intervention.
Future prospects
In looking at possible future directions for politics in Fiji, we must again consider the
notion of regime vulnerability and, in this context, examine also the concepts of overt
and covert regimes. In the earlier discussion of the 1970-1987 period, it was evident
that although the liberal-democratic framework operated at a superficial level as an
'overt' regime, there was at the same time a stronger 'covert' regime operating
through traditionalist conceptions of legitimacy. But it took a change of government
under the democratic provisions of the constitution to reveal the relative strength —
or weakness— ofeach of these. Following from this, it is logical to depict the liberal-
democratic pattern of civil-military relations during the same period as an overt but
weakly supported model, whereas the traditional-aristocratic pattern operated at a
covert level, but was more strongly supported by the same traditionalist legitimator.
The coup of May 1987, then, can be viewed not only as an act of intervention for the
purpose of destroying the liberal-democratic facade, but also as an exercise in regime
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maintenance insofar as it restored the eastern chiefly elite to power - but this time as
the overt regime.
The traditionalist regime is now supported formally (and overtly) by a
constitution which does little to disguise its essentially undemocratic character. As
suggested earlier, however, it lacks the support of a majority of the population,
especially as it is explicitly designed to relegate the substantial population of Fiji
Indians to electoral irrelevance. In addition, it discriminates heavily against urban
Fijians, as well as those from the central and western regions, in favourofthe eastern
provinces. It is primarily for these reasons that the current regime may, in the final
analysis, carry within it the seeds of its own destruction. Far from keeping the
indigenous Fijians united in opposition to Fiji Indians, the new constitution is much
more likely to serve as an instrument for its political fracture. How long this process
may take depends on too many variables for any certain answer to be given. But on
any reasonable assessment, the future stability ofthe chiefly regime mustbe in doubt
— an assessment which has obvious implications for the role of the military. For
whatever happens in the arena of civil politics, the military has established itself in
a guardian role. In the terms expressed by Luckham (1 97 1 :27), the military now has
a strong ideological disposition towards regarding itself as the 'Platonic guardian'
of the national interest. This points to the maintenance of a covert military regime
operating beneath the level of the overt chieflyAraditionalist regime. And the
praetorian character ofthis development does indeed suggest that the military in Fiji
has become a homus politicus in its own right.
Conclusion
Whatever specific pattern ofcivil-military relations emerges in Fiji, it can be said with
some certainty that democratic constitutionalist principles are unlikely to prevail in
the shorter term. Despite the high-sounding title assigned to the new republic, there is
little or no commitment on the part of either chiefly or military leaders in support of
these principles. Indeed, much of their traditionalist rhetoric since the coup has been
directed explicitly against the 'alien' concepts associated with democratic politics
(see especially Dean and Ritova 1988). The logical foundations of the traditionalist
view, and the ideology supporting it, have been dealt with critically elsewhere (see
Lawson 1990a and 1990b). But whatever claims can be mounted against the logical
and ethical bases of political legitimacy in contemporary Fiji, the strength of the
prevailing orthodoxies lends sufficient rhetorical force to arguments countering both
domestic and external pressures for 'democratization*. The efficacy of this rhetoric is
further strengthened by appeals to the slogan, increasingly popular in international
discourse, of 'indigenous rights'. In addition, there is a pervasive belief that 'plural
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societies' are incapable of sustaining peaceful democratic politics, and can only be
managed effectively through relatively authoritarian institutions (see Lawson 1990a).
This means that both the military forces and the current civilian regime have escaped
much of the international invective that might otherwise have been directed against
the constitutional entrenchment of a system of political apartheid. Nonetheless, Fiji
cannot entirely avoid stigmatization in an international political environment which
has adopted 'the dominant motif of equality and human rights' and given normative
endorsement to 'the universalization ofdemocracy' (Premdas and Steeves 1991 : 1 64).
Democracy may have become an international 'hurrah' word, but there is a
limit to the styles of government to which it can be applied with any degree of
accuracy. It needs to be emphasized, therefore, that apart from the elements of
apartheid evident in the new constitition, the homuspoliticus role of the military in
Fiji is incompatible with any modem democratic notion of civilian supremacy. It is
especially contrary to the democratic principles embodied in the doctrine of
constitutionalism. In otherwords, ifthe military becomes adefacto partofthe political
system insofar as it plays a covert role in determining political leadership, it cannot
be considered the apolitical institution that democratic theory demands. Finally, the
effective guardianship of Fiji's 'national interest' by the military betrays an
essential weakness in the political culture that has sustained the chauvinistic
assertion of 'indigenous rights'. For wherever the threat of force is a necessary
condition for maintaining a particular regime, it follows that the regime itselflacks
the degree of legitimacy required for long-term political stability.
Notes
1 As a lieutenant-colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka was then the third-ranking officer in the Royal Fiji Military
Forces. He became commander of the Fiji Military Forces and was promoted to the rank of major-
general.
2 This section is based on a much more detailed account set out in Lawson (1991a).
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